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From Discourse to Dispositif: 
Miche l Foucault's Two Histories 
Matti Peltonen 
Foucault and the Methodology of Social Science 
The French philosopher and historian Michel Foucault is today one of 
the most often-cited names in the social and human sciences. He is 
frequently described as a poststructuralist and mentioned as one of the 
fathers of postmodernist thinking in the social sciences. He was also a 
theorist of power, prison, body and sexuality, and several anthologies 
discuss his writings from the perspective of education, religion or ethics. 
Foucault also had a special theory of discourse, which is mentioned 
frequently in social scientific research. 
For historians Foucault's popularity grew in the 1990s. This 
development was especially relevant for one branch of historical research, 
the new cultural history, which has become influential in the United States, 
and where it has been made widely known by two theoretical anthologies 
edited by Lynn Hunt.1 Foucault's impact upon the new cultural history is 
largely due to the seminal works from the later period of his career: 
1. New Cultural History, ed. Lynn Hunt (Berkeley, 1989), Beyond the Cultural Turn. New 
Direction in the Study of Society and Culture, ed. Victoria Bonnell and Lynn Hunt (Berkeley, 
1999). 
Matti Peltonen is Professor of Social History in the Department of Social Science History at the 
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Discipline and Punish (1975) and The History of Sexuality: An Introduction 
(1976).2 
I would argue that a problem lies in the way Foucault's texts were 
introduced in the mid to late 1980s. The problem is that most of the 
methodological work in the social sciences and cultural studies treats 
Foucault's method primarily as discourse analysis. This is, however, an 
excessively narrow view, especially when we take into account not just his 
methodological texts, but also his empirical works and in particular 
Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality. This failure holds the 
danger of forgetting what was most original and interesting in Foucault's 
thinking. In several of his more popular empirical studies Foucault was 
interested in a much wider phenomenon than discourse. He also studied 
practices and an abstraction that he called dispositifs, by which he meant 
historically specific totalities of discourses and practices. In English 
translations of Foucault's works dispositifis translated using various terms 
(apparatus, deployment, construct, alignment, positivities, etc.) which 
together make the central importance of the concept unnecessarily 
difficult to detect.3 Seeing Foucault only as a discourse theorist also gives 
the new cultural history an excessively narrow view of culture. This 
perhaps helps to explain why it has not led to the intellectual breakthrough 
expected in the late 1980s.4 
The Textbook Image of Foucault 
Seeing Foucault as essentially a theorist of discourse has led social 
scientists writing on his work to overlook or at least distort his opinions on 
many important theoretical issues. The most extreme example of 
misrepresenting Foucault's thinking is to describe him as supporting the 
2. I use throughout this article the English titles of Foucault's translated works. Readers 
are reminded, however, that Madness and Civilization is not translated from Foucault's 
dissertation published in 1961, but from a later condensed version. 
3. This is also mentioned by David Halphen in his Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay 
Hagiography (New York, 1995), pp. 41, 188-89 and 201. In a recent translation of Foucault's 
"Society Must Be Defended, " Lectures at the College de France, 1975-1976, ed. Mauro Bertani 
and Alessandro Fontana, trans. David Macey (New York, 2003), dispositif is rendered as "the 
grid of intelligibility." 
4. On the pessimistic accounts of the merits of new cultural history see, for instance, the 
recent articles of William Sewell and Geoff Eley. William H. Sewell Jr . , "Whatever Happened 
to the 'Social' in Social History" in Schools of Thought: Twenty-Five Years of Interpretative 
Social Science, ed. Joan W. Scott and Debra Keater (Princeton, 2001), pp. 209-26; Geoff Eley, 
"Is All the World a Text? From Social History to the History of Society Two Decades Later" in 
The Historical Turn in the Human Sciences, ed. Terrence J. McDonald (Ann Arbor, 1996), pp. 
193-244. 
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strong version of social constructivism. This misrepresentation often occurs 
in works regarded as reliable textbooks. For instance, C. G. Prado in his 
Starting with Foucault: An Introduction to Genealogy claims that according 
to Foucaul t" . . . madness is an invention.. ." and suggests that the main 
emphasis of Foucault's argument is that '"the subject' is a product of 
discourse rather than being prior to discourse." He further writes that 
Foucault's Discipline and Punish informs u s " . . . how prisoners came to be 
talked about and treated, and in doing so it lays out how a subject was 
manufactured."5 A similar interpretation can be found in Rudi Visker's 
introduction to Foucault. Visker claims that the originality of Foucault's The 
History of Sexuality lies in the fact that, contrary to the so called repression 
hypothesis of Western sexuality, " . . . he had to analyze sexuality as 
discourse, i. e. as something which comes into being in and through 
discourse and does not precede it."6 
The dominant interpretation from the social sciences has influenced the 
new cultural history. As an example we can examine the methodological 
anthology New Cultural History (1989) and Patricia O'Brien's article which 
treats Foucault as a cultural theorist with path-breaking new insights. 
According to O'Brien, Foucault claims that the world consists of nothing 
but discourses. She thinks this view of the world frees the cultural theorist 
from the reductionist thinking that rendered both social history and 
Marxism uninteresting. "The state, the body, society, sex, the soul, the 
economy are not stable objects, they are discourses."7 
O'Brien's interpretation of Foucault's thinking is so exaggerated that the 
editor, Lynn Hunt, gives a word of warning in the introduction. She asks the 
question: If everything is discourse, so is there nothing else left at all? 
Loyalty prevents her from developing the inquiry into a clearer statement 
of disagreement with some of her younger colleagues. She is, however, 
clearly of another opinion, and delineates several times how discourses 
5. C. G. Prado, Starting with Foucault: An Introduction to Genealogy, second edition 
(Boulder, 2000), pp. 23, 57, 58. 
6. Rudi Visker, Michel Foucault. Genealogy as Critique, trans. Chris Turner (London, 
1995), p. 78. 
7. Patricia O'Brien, "Michel Foucault's History of Culture" inNew Cultural History, p. 36. 
In the interview "The Confession of the Flesh" (1977), a group of young scholars discussed 
with Foucault his The History of Sexuality. One of them, J.-A. Miller, refused to believe that 
institutions like hospitals can consist of nothing else but discourses. Foucault, in the end, had 
to surrender to this stubborn argument in order to be able to continue with the interview! See 
Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge. Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977, ed. 
Colin Gordon (Brighton, 1980), pp. 197-98. 
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affect the world we live in, rather than create it.8 Timidity in the face of the 
strong formulation of social constructivism is also present in the more 
recent theoretical anthology Beyond the Cultural Turn (1999), edited by 
Lynn Hunt and Victoria Bonnell. In their introduction the editors describe 
the intellectual climate in which the new cultural history was born: 
Following the lead of Foucault and Derrida, poststructuralists and 
postmodernists insisted that shared discourses (or cultures) so 
utterly permeate our perception of reality as to make any supposed 
scientific explanation of social life simply an exercise in collective 
fictionalization or mythmaking: we can only elaborate on our 
presuppositions, in this view; we cannot arrive at any objective 
truth. . . . [T]he cultural turn threatened to efface all reference to 
social context or causes and offered no particular standard of 
judgment to replace the seemingly more rigorous and systematic 
approaches that had predominated during the 1960s and 1970s.9 
This is, of course, an apt description of the intellectual climate that 
prevailed in many Western universities during the 1980s. To link the name 
of Michel Foucault (side by side with his worst philosophical enemy, 
Jacques Derrida!) to this development is questionable. Can we harness his 
intellectual authority to justify the pessimistic interpretation of the so-called 
linguistic turn? As a preliminary answer to this question I would cite from 
the closing arguments of Foucault's lectures given in 1983 at the University 
of California and published recently as Fearless Speech. Here Foucault 
explains the methodological principles of his approach to history, which he 
had started to call problematization in the early 1980s: 
Some people have interpreted this type of analysis as a form of 
'historical idealism', but I think that such an analysis is completely 
different. For when I say I am studying the 'problematization' of 
madness, crime, or sexuality, it is not a way of denying the reality of 
such phenomena. On the contrary, I have tried to show that it was 
precisely some real existent in the world, which was the target of 
social regulation at a given moment. The question I raise is this one: 
How and why were very different things in the world gathered 
together, characterized, analyzed, and treated as, for example, 
8. Lynn Hunt: "Introduction: History, Culture, and Text" in New Cultural History, pp. 10 
and 17. 
9. Victoria Bonnell and Lynn Hunt: "Introduction" mBeyond the Cultural Turn, pp. 3 and 
9. 
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'mental illness'? . . . The problematization is an 'answer' to a 
concrete situation which is real. 1 0 
It is very difficult to reconcile this declaration of intent with later 
interpretations of Foucault's thinking. The purpose of this article is to show 
that Foucault "the social historian," who wrote Discipline and Punish and 
The History of Sexuality, cannot be read as an extreme advocate of social 
constructivism. This view, widely spread in the 1980s and 1990s, ignores 
the nonsymbolic part of reality, and would be untruthful even if we 
considered Foucault only as a discourse theorist. The other side of the 
problem is that Foucault's work, both theoretical and empirical, contained 
ideas which went considerably further than discourse theory. 
Foucault's Approaches to Historical Study 
For our purposes, Foucault's works can be roughly divided into two 
parts. The first, consisting of "social historical" works, includes Madness 
and Civilization (1961), the Birth of the Clinic (1963), Discipline and Punish 
(1975) and The History of Sexuality (1976-84). The second, which appeared 
during the 1960s and early 1970s, concerns the history of science, and 
includes The Order of Things (1966), The Archeology of Knowledge (1969) 
and The Order of Discourse (1970). The two latter works describe the 
method Foucault used for the history of ideas and his history of science. 
This division of Foucault's works does not perhaps appear as 
sophisticated as the more common division into an earlier period identified 
with the archaeology of science, and a later period concerned with the 
genealogy of power. I will, however, show that my characterization of the 
main building blocks of Foucault's works correspond closely to his own 
ideas on what he had accomplished. Furthermore, my approach gives due 
10. Michel Foucault, Fearless Speech, ed. Joseph Pearson (Los Angeles, 2001), pp. 171-72. 
One can also consult Foucault's "My Body, This Paper, This Fire"—an answer to Derrida's 
critique of Madness and Civilization—to confirm his reaction to the thesis that the world 
consists only of discourses. Michel Foucault, Power. The Essential Works of Foucault 1954¬ 
1984, vol. 3, ed. James D. Faubion (New York, 2000), p. 416. Also a late interview conducted 
in 1984 is instructive: "Problematization doesn't mean the representation of a pre-existing 
object, nor the creation through discourse of an object that doesn't exist. It is a set of 
discursive and non-discursive practices that makes something enter into the play of truth and 
false, and constitutes it as an object for thought (whether under the form of moral reflection, 
scientific knowledge, or political analysis, etc. . .) ." Michel Foucault, "The Concern for Truth" 
in Michel Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture. Interviews and Other Writings 1977-1984, ed. 
Lawrence D. Kritzman (New York, 1988), p. 257.1 have corrected the English translation with 
the help of Robert Castel, "'Problematization' as a Mode of Reading History" in Foucault and 
the Writing of History, ed. Jan Goldstein (Oxford, 1994), p. 250. 
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attention to parts other than simply the discourse analysis of Foucault's 
works and is in that way more comprehensive than the more conventional 
treatment. The usual method of dividing Foucault's work is also 
problematic for several other reasons. It tends to give priority to the object 
of research. Furthermore, it does not give attention to the label Foucault 
applied to his approach in the 1980s, that of problematization. In addition, 
it is quite difficult to describe two early works, Madness and Civilization 
and The Birth of the Clinic, as merely examples of the archaeology of 
knowledge. This defines them far too narrowly." 
Foucault gave one of his first methodological statements in his 
candidacy proposal for the College de France. 1 2 He opened the 
presentation by stating the issue investigated in Madness and Civilization: 
what was known about madness in a certain period of history? He then 
divided the question into more specific parts by cataloguing his research 
data. First, he mentioned medical theories, general fears and prejudices, 
theatre and literature as sources for definitions of madness. He further 
noted that all this was not enough. One could not remain in the sphere of 
sources used in the ordinary history of ideas. He was also interested in 
knowing how madness was detected, how a person defined as mad was 
separated from others and moved outside the community into institutions 
and given treatment, as well as what kind of institutions these were, and 
who the authorities were who decided on these procedures and on what 
grounds. In short, what kinds of institutions and practices were involved in 
producing madness? For this purpose it was necessary to investigate 
archives and the material contained in them, such as official orders, 
statutes, hospital and prison records, court proceedings and similar 
material. " . . . I undertook the analysis of a knowledge whose visible body 
is not theoretical or scientific discourse, nor literature either, but a 
regulated, everyday practice." 1 3 
11. Beatrice Han divides Foucault's career into three periods, archaeology (1963-75), 
genealogy (1975-84), and the history of subjectivity (1984). This periodization leaves 
Foucault's important dissertation on madness outside any classification. The other problem 
is that the classification of periods is not coherent, and the third period is based on the subject 
of research while the two earlier periods are based on methodology. Furthermore, Han's 
classification cannot take into account the fact that Foucault did not abandon archaeology 
when adopting genealogy. See Beatrice Han, Foucault's Critical Project. Between the 
Transcendental and the Historical, trans. Edward Pile (Stanford, 2002), p. xiii. 
12. Michel Foucault, "Candidacy Presentation: College de France, 1969" in Michel 
Foucault, Ethics. Subjectivity and Truth. The Essential Works of Michel Foucault 1954-1984, vol. 
1, ed. Paul Rabinow. (London, 1997), pp. 5-10. 
13. Michel Foucault, "Candidacy Presentation: College de France, 1969," p. 6. 
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This is how Foucault presented himself in an official context as a 
researcher. The presentation continued in an interesting fashion, as he 
defined his recent work as an exception to his main area of interest. 
Foucault stated that in The Order of Things (1966) he experimentally left 
"the whole practical and institutional side but without giving up the idea of 
going back to it one day. . ." u In an interview two years earlier (1967) he 
had also stated: 
There is nothing to be gained from describing this autonomous layer 
of discourses unless one can relate it to other layers, practices, 
institutions, social relations, political relations, and so on. It is that 
relationship which has always intrigued me, and in Histoire de la 
folie [Madness and Civilization] and Naissance de la clinique [The 
Birth of the Clinic], I tried to define the relation between these 
different domains. 1 5 
These statements of intent from the late 1960s were not isolated incidents. 
Ten years later, in a well-known interview called "Questions of Method," 
he again explained the main characteristics of his approach. Here he 
compared Madness and Civilization (1961) with Discipline and Punish 
(1975), highlighting how the study of practices was paramount in both 
works: 
In this piece of research on the prisons, as in my other earlier work, 
the target of analysis wasn't 'institutions', 'theories', or 'ideology' but 
practices [italics in the original] — with the aim of grasping the 
conditions that make these acceptable at a given moment; the 
hypothesis being that these types of practice are not just governed 
by institutions, prescribed by ideologies, guided by pragmatic 
circumstances — whatever role these elements may actually 
play — but, up to a point, possess their own specific regularities, 
logic, strategy, self-evidence, and 'reason'. It is a question of 
analysing a 'regime of practices'—practices being understood here 
as places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and 
14. Ibid. 
15. Michel Foucault, "On the Ways of Writing History" in Michel Foucault, Aesthetics, 
Method, and Epistemology. The Essential Works of Foucault 1954-1984, vol 2, ed. J ames D. 
Faubion and Paul Rabinow (New York, 1998), pp. 284-85. 
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reasons given, the planned and the taken-for-granted meet and 
interconnect.1 6 
The characterization of Foucault's approach as consisting of two 
different modes, one resembling social history and the other intellectual 
history, was not just accidental, and Foucault repeated the point time after 
time throughout his career. An example worth citing comes from the late 
1970s, when, in a book-long interview conducted by the Italian journalist 
Duccio Trombadori and originally published in 1981, Foucault spoke of his 
"books of explorations" and "books of method." Of the latter type he 
mentioned The Order of Things (1966) as the prime example . 7 Four years 
later, in 1982 in an interview conducted by Rux Martin, he gave a similar 
description of his writings as described in the candidacy presentation in 
1969: 
I have written two kinds of books. One, The Order of Things, is 
concerned only with scientific thought; the other, Discipline and 
Punish, is concerned with social principles and institutions. History 
of science doesn't develop in the same way as social sensibility. In 
order to be recognized as scientific discourse, thought must obey 
certain criteria. In Discipline and Punish, texts, practices, and people 
struggle against each other.1 8 
What Is Meant by Dispositif? 
As mentioned above, historians, including new cultural historians, place 
their highest value on Foucault's "social historical" works, Discipline and 
Punish and The History of Sexuality. These are often given as examples or 
sources of inspiration. They are, however, more difficult than Foucault's 
works in the field of intellectual history, which include several 
comprehensive texts where his method is carefully explained, texts such 
as The Archaeology of Knowledge, or his inaugural lecture at the College 
16. Michel Foucault, "Questions of Method" in The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality, ed. Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (London, 1991), p. 75. 
See also Michel Foucault, "Questions of Method" in Michel Foucault, Power. The Essential 
Works of Foucault, p. 225. 
17. Michel Foucault, Remarks on Marx: Conversations with Duccio Trombadori, trans. R. 
James Goldstein and James Cascaito (New York, 1991), pp. 96-101. 
18. Rux Martin, "Truth, Power, Self: An Interview with Michel Foucault" in Technologies 
of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault, ed. Luther H. Martin, Huck Gutman and Patrick 
H. Hutton (London, 1988), p. 14. 
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de France, The Order of Discourse. This side of Foucault's work is typically 
given ample attention in textbooks and introductions to his thought. 
Foucault's methodology is usually called discourse analysis, and the terms 
often applied to his work—the archaeology of knowledge and the 
genealogy of power — belong to this area. Discourse analysis is Foucault's 
contribution to the repertoire of intellectual history and does not, as such, 
constitute any problem. 
On the other hand, Foucault's other approach, his "social history" and 
the method used when researching the history of madness, prison or 
western sexuality, is not so well covered. Foucault himself wrote only one 
short article explaining his methodology in Discipline and Punish. 
Otherwise, his opinions have to be collected, in the way I have indicated 
above, by combing through his interviews and articles scattered in several 
publications. In Madness and Civilization, Discipline and Punish and The 
History of Sexuality, Foucault's seminal social historical texts, one can 
detect a coherent metanarrative. The separation of mentally ill patients in 
institutions, a more liberal ideology of punishment for crimes, or the sexual 
liberation of the 1960s are strong and independent discourses. They 
cannot, however, be easily reduced to what had happened or was done. 
There were, indeed, important practices not included in these discourses 
and which could contradict them. Allowing for this discrepancy was 
important for Foucault. Furthermore, without the relativization of 
discourses to practices he would not have achieved the results that made 
his works original and exciting in the first place. 
Foucault explained only in a fragmentary fashion what he thought about 
the approach to history that went beyond the history of science. Here and 
there in his smaller articles and interviews, however, we find statements 
which usually center upon the concept of dispositif, and which involve a 
more comprehensive object of study than either discourses or systems of 
thought. We can find statements making this point from the entire range 
of his career spanning from the 1960s to the early 1980s. This indicates that 
the concept of the dispositif did not simply occur to him at a certain 
moment, but was an idea central to explicating his purposes throughout 
his career. The best known and most often cited collection of articles and 
interviews, Power/Knowledge (1980), edited by Colin Gordon, includes an 
interview from 1977 in which Foucault gave a exceptionally detailed 
definition of what he meant by the dispositif. In this translation it is 
translated as apparatus: 
What I'm trying to pick out with this term is, firstly, a thoroughly 
heterogeneous ensemble of discourses, institutions, architectural 
forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific 
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19. Michel Foucault, "The Confession of the Flesh" in Michel Foucault, 
Power/Knowledge, pp. 194-95. The famous passage in The History of Sexuality denying the 
extreme constructivist interpretation of his work can also be read in support of this definition 
of the dispositif (translated as deployment at this time). Michel Foucault, The History of 
Sexuality. An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (London, 1979), pp. 151-52. 
20. Dominick LaCapra, "Rethinking Intellectual History and Reading Texts" in Modern 
European Intellectual History: Reappraisals and New Perspectives, ed. Dominick LaCapra and 
Steven L. Kaplan (Ithaca, 1982), p. 62; Hayden White, "Foucault's Discourse: The 
Historiography of Anti-Humanism" in Hayden White, The Content of the Form: Narrative 
Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore, 1987), p. 105. 
statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions — in 
short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the 
apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of relations that can be 
established between these elements. Secondly, what I am trying to 
identify in this apparatus is precisely the nature of the connection 
that can exist between these heterogeneous elements. Thus, a 
particular discourse can figure at one time as a programme of an 
institution, and at another it can function as a means of justifying or 
masking a practice which itself remains silent, or as a secondary re-
interpretation of this practice, opening out for it a new field of 
rationality. In short, between these elements, whether discursive or 
non-discursive, there is a sort of interplay of shifts of positions and 
modifications of function which can also vary very widely. Thirdly, 
I understand by the term 'apparatus' a sort of — shall we 
say — formation which has as its major function at a given historical 
moment that of responding to an urgent need. The apparatus thus 
has a dominant strategic function. This may have been, for example, 
the assimilation of a floating population found to be burdensome for 
an essentially mercantilist economy: there was a strategic 
imperative acting here as the matrix for an apparatus which 
gradually undertook the control or subjection of madness, mental 
illness and neurosis. 1 9 
This passage makes clear that Foucault was as interested in the 
nondiscursive as the discursive elements of culture. He did not even arrive 
at the thought that they would in some way be the same, as some Foucault 
experts have claimed. Especially important to notice is that he did not 
define nondiscursive as part of the discursive domain, as Hayden White 
and Dominick LaCapra have interpreted his ideas about the dispositif.20 A 
second interesting aspect of Foucault's definition of the term is that he 
emphasized changing historical relationships, which were not constant or 
preordained. Historical specificity remains a central element in Foucault's 
Michel Foucault's Two Histories 215 
methodological thinking. Especially important in this regard is the 
relationship between discursive and nondiscursive domains. Their 
connection is not fixed, but can take different forms. For that reason there 
can be no specific theories about this relationship, nor of the relationship 
between two successive dispositifs. Thirdly, the importance of the specific 
context is illustrated by describing dispositifs as functional parts of larger 
situations. This contextualization is, although in quite general fashion, a 
way of stressing the historical specificity of the phenomenon under study. 
In the 1960s and early 1970s Foucault often used the expression 
"discursive practices." They belong, however, to the domain of discourses 
and do not concern the nondiscursive sphere. 2 1 The idea that discursive 
practices in some way could also include nondiscursive phenomena, that 
the nondiscursive were at the last instant discursive, is not possible. In the 
1980s Foucault frequently used the expression "problematization," 
apparently referring to the political relevance of a dispositif. 
It is true that my attitude isn't a result of the form of critique that 
claims to be a methodical examination in order to reject all possible 
solutions except for the one valid one. It is more on the order of 
'problematization' — which is to say, the development of a domain 
of acts, practices, and thoughts that seem to me to pose problems 
for politics. 2 2 
Another area illustrating the methodological role of dispositifs is to be 
found in the much appreciated monographs Foucault published in the 
1970s. The centrality of dispositifs is clearly seen in both Discipline and 
Punishment (1975) and in The History of Sexuality (1976). The historical 
succession of two major dispositifs are given a highly dramatic description 
at the beginning of Discipline and Punish, where Foucault gives examples 
of punishment by torture and solitary confinement. Later in the book he 
writes about the "carceral system" and provides the following definition: 
it "combines in a single figure discourses and architectures, coercive 
regulations and scientific propositions, real social effects and invincible 
Utopias, programmes for correcting delinquents and mechanisms that 
reinforce delinquency." 2 3 Again, it is laid out clearly that the penal 
21. See, for instance, Michel Foucault, "The Will to Knowledge" in Michel Foucault, 
Ethics, Subjectivity and Truth, pp. 11-12. 
22. Michel Foucault, "Polemics, Politics and Problematizations: An Interview," in The 
Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York, 1984), p. 384. 
23. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan 
(London, 1991), p. 271. 
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apparatus is not just a bundle of discourses or an illusion created by them, 
but something more heterogeneous and tangible. 
In The History of Sexuality the concept of dispositif has an even more 
visible organizing role, although the English translation, which gives several 
unhelpful interpretations of this important word (for instance, deployment 
and construct) makes the reading of this text extremely difficult. The topic 
of the book is to analyze the change between two dispositifs 
(deployments), the movement from the dispositif of alliance ("a system of 
marriage, of fixation and development of kinship ties, of transmission of 
names and possessions") to the dispositif of sexuality.24 
The two systems can be contrasted term by term. The deployment 
of alliance is built around a system of rules defining the permitted 
and the forbidden, the licit and the illicit, whereas the deployment 
of sexuality operates according to mobile, polymorphous, and 
contingent techniques of power. The deployment of alliance has as 
one of its chief objectives to reproduce the interplay of relations and 
maintain the law that governs them; the deployment of sexuality, on 
the other hand, engenders a continual extension of areas and forms 
of control. For the first, what is pertinent is the link between partners 
and definite statutes; the second is concerned with the sensations 
of the body, the quality of pleasures, and the nature of impressions, 
however tenuous or imperceptible these may be. Lastly, if the 
deployment of alliance is firmly tied to the economy due to the role 
it can play in the transmission or circulation of wealth, the 
deployment of sexuality is linked to the economy through numerous 
and subtle relays, the main one of which, however, is the body — the 
body that produces and consumes. 2 5 
Again, one should pay attention to the nature of these dispositifs. They 
consist both of discursive and nondiscursive elements, they are historical 
and culturally bound to a certain area or civilization, and they are answers 
to certain greater problems in a particular society. These examples are 
hopefully convincing enough to show that Foucault's approach during 
several periods in his career was much more comprehensive than just 
discourse analysis. It is, however, a disappointing fact that the 
overwhelming majority of introductions to Foucault's work do not mention 
24. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, p. 106. 
25. Ibid., pp. 106-7. 
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this larger approach. Even the concept dispositif is absent from the texts of 
most Foucault experts, or it is interpreted in a misleading manner. 
Why Take Only Half the Man? 
We need to ask why the large expanse of literature of Foucault's body 
of work is methodologically so selective. Why is only discourse analysis 
highlighted while the more comprehensive idea of analysing social 
totalities, the dispositif, forgotten? Why has Foucault's contribution to 
intellectual history so dominated the academic world? Part of the answer 
rests in the attractive definitions — such as archaeology and 
genealogy — provided in his approach in discourse analysis.2 6 These 
contributed to the history of ideas and showed a critical attitude to older 
approaches in the field. Foucault's alternative to the traditional history of 
ideas was easily grasped given his two large tracts, The Archaeology of 
Knowledge (1969) and The Order of Discourse (1970), in which he patiently 
explained his intentions regarding the history of science. Nevertheless, the 
attempt to reconcile these two methodological texts with the totality of his 
research has proven very difficult. One of the best examples of this is Alan 
Megill's suggestion that The Archaeology of Knowledge is just a private 
joke. For Megill, Foucault's book is a parodic repetition of Descartes' 
Discourse on Method.27 On the other hand, Foucault explained his social-
historical methodology only in one often neglected text, a short article 
called "The Dust and the Cloud," in which he answered criticism leveled 
against Discipline and Punish.28 
Foucault is not the first major thinker who is only partially understood. 
It is indeed instructive to compare the reception of his ideas with the fate 
of Max Weber's methodological ideas in the hands of Talcott Parsons and 
26. For a comprehensive definition of archaeology, see Michel Foucault, The Archaeology 
of Knowledge, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (London, 1972), pp. 138-40. By genealogy Foucault 
understood "a form of history that can account for the constitution of knowledges, discourses, 
domains of objects, and so on, without having to make reference to a subject that is either 
transcendental in relations to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness throughout the 
course of history." Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power" in Michel Foucault, Power, p. 118. 
27. Alan Megill, Prophets of Extremity. Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida (Berkeley, 
1985), p. 228. 
28. Michel Foucault, "The Dust and the Cloud" in French Studies in History, vol 2, ed. 
Maurice Aymard and Harbans Mukha (New Delhi, 1990), pp. 323-33. Foucault defended his 
work against the critique of a very traditional historian which unfortunately diminished the 
informative value of this rare contribution. 
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his followers.2 9 After Parson's translation (1930) of Weber's seminal 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, the historicity of his theory 
about the economic role of the Protestant ethic has been rejected, and the 
majority of social scientists interpret Weber as if he had stated that the 
Protestant ethic belonged to the social reality of the twentieth century. In 
fact, Weber strongly denied such claims and simply intended to show that 
the earlier Protestant ethic was structurally a similar ethos to the prevailing 
capitalist spirit. Without historical specificity of concept it is impossible to 
understand correctly what he proposed to say in his famous essay; 
consequently, most of the discussions start from a misinterpretation of his 
thesis on the role of Protestant religiosity in the modem world. A similar 
trick has been played on Foucault. 
The other aspect of the difficulties associated with understanding 
Weber and Foucault can be seen in the concept of the dispositif. Weber's 
interpretation of the concept of ethos, or spirit, was equally heterogeneous, 
and it has not been accepted in the way Weber intended at the beginning 
of the twentieth century. For Weber, ethos was an historical construct 
comprising both behavioural acts and intellectual attitudes and ideas. 
Periodically, Weber wrote, certain ideas and forms of action attach to each 
other and form totalities that prove long lasting and become recognized as 
phenomena in their own right. To him, the Protestant ethic and the spirit 
of capitalism were such lifeforms. Structurally, Foucault's use of the idea 
of specific historical dispositifs is quite similar to Weber's methodological 
approach. It is easy to understand that both ideas are a poor fit in those 
social sciences designed to avoid historical specificity and create the 
illusion of a universality of concepts and methods. This helps to explain 
why Foucault's discourse analysis is accepted and his historical concept 
dispositif largely ignored. 
Today, with the popularity of an exaggerated social constructivism 
diminishing, we are in danger of losing the fulness of Michel Foucault's 
achievements. 3 0 This would be a too high a price for mistakes so easily 
corrected. The widespread popularity of Foucault's work in the social and 
29. There are several similarities in the way both these thinkers have been misunderstood 
in twentieth-century thought, and the historical nature of their methodologies was similar. As 
Geoffrey Hodgson has noted in How Economics Forgot History: The Problem of Historical 
Specificity in Social Science (London, 2001), time conceived as history is not just one variable 
among several similar variables in a multidimensional model of a society. One can raise and 
lower the level of rent or output, but time moves only in one direction. On this, see, for 
instance, Fernand Braudel, On History (Chicago, 1980), p. 49. 
30. Dominick LaCapra's "Rereading Foucault's 'History of Madness'" is a promising new 
start with Foucault in the field of cultural studies. Dominick LaCapra, History and Reading: 
Tocqueville, Foucault, French Studies (Toronto, 2000), pp. 123-68. 
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31. Willem Frijhoff forcefully makes this point in "Foucault Reformed by Certeau: 
Historical Strategies of Discipline and Everyday Tactics of Appropriation" in Cultural History 
after Foucault, ed. John Neubauer (New York, 1999), p. 87. 
human sciences has not adequately taken in account his theories and 
methodological thinking.31 This is the imbalance that needs correction. 
